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Abstract: This study aims to empirically test the effects of auditor rotation and auditor tenure on an
auditor’s independence in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the years 2002-2010.
This study using logistic regression estimation technique. The results show that, statistically, the auditor’s
tenure has significant negative effects on the auditor’s independence, measured by the tendency to give a
‘going concern’ opinion. Furthermore, the results also show significant differences between the effects of
short and long term tenures on the auditors’ independence. Auditor rotation has significant positive
effects on the auditors’ independence.
Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji secara empiris pengaruh rotasi auditor dan masa kerja auditor terhadap
independensi auditor pada perusahaan yang listed di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama tahun 2002-2010. Penelitian ini
menggunakan teknik estimasi regresi logistik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa secara statistik, masa kerja auditor
berpengaruh signifikan negatif  terhadap independensi auditor yang diukur dengan kecenderungan memberikan opini
‘berkelanjutan.’ Hasil penelitian juga menunjukkan perbedaan signifikan antara pengaruh masa kerja auditor yang
pendek dan lama pada independensi auditor. Rotasi auditor berpengaruh positif  signifikan terhadap independensi auditor.
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Introduction
This study empirically re-tests the ef-
fect of rotating auditors on the independence
of auditors, in relation to the phenomenon
of the artificial rotation of auditors in Indo-
nesia, before the appearance of the newest
regulation on partners’ (public accountants)
rotation. The results of the empirical study
show different outcomes on whether or not
the mandatory auditor rotation is important.
Geiger and Raghunandan (2001), Myers et al.
(2003), Johnson et al. (2002) state that au-
diting and financial reporting, and auditors’
tenure are passively related, so that the re-
sults of the research do not support the ex-
istence of mandatory auditor rotation.
Daugherty et al. (2013), Johnson et al. (2002),
Siregar et al. (2011) do not find evidence that
rotating auditors increases the quality of fi-
nancial reports.
In Indonesia, the regulation about man-
datory auditor and partner rotation has faced
some alterations. The regulation began with
the Decree of the Minister of Finance
No.423/KMK.06/2002 which was super-
seded by No.359/KMK.06/2003, that obliges
companies to limit an auditor’s assignment
period to 5 years and a public accountant’s
to 3 years. That decree then was revised by
the Decree of  the Minister of  Finance No.17/
PMK.01/2008 about public accountants’
service which limited the auditor’s assignment
period to 6 years and the public accountant’s
to 3 years. On April 6, 2015 the government
published Government Regulation No.20 of
2015 about Public Accountants’ Practices
(PP 20/2015) which is a further regulation
of  Law No.5 of  2011 about public accoun-
tants. In relation to the regulation of  public
accountants’ service rotations, it is written
in Article 11 PP 20/2015, Article 11 Verse
(1) which explains that: The service of  au-
diting of  historical financial information, as
meant in Article 10 Verse (1) letter “a”, of
any certain entity by a public accountant is
limited to 5 (five) years financial records in
succession.
Furthermore, this research also tests
whether the artificial rotation of auditors can
influence the auditors’ independence. Mautz
and Sharaf (1961) state that an auditor must
be aware of a lot of conditions which may
tend to influence their attitude and indepen-
dence. On one side, an auditor’s tenure is re-
lated to the high professionalism that is ob-
tained by the auditor, in this case, from a long
tenure, because the auditor may get a better
understanding about the business’ processes
and the risks facing the client’s company. On
the other hand, an auditor’s tenure is related
to the lower awareness of the auditor, be-
cause of the over-familiarity between the
auditor and the client (Mautz and Sharaf,
1961).
The importance of auditor indepen-
dence encourages the regulator to regulate the
length of  an auditor’s assignment period in
order to improve independence. However, the
empirical findings which show the effects of
auditors’ tenure and rotation on the audits’
quality have not been conclusive. Some re-
search shows that tenure has negative influ-
ences on an audit’s quality (Mansi et al. 2004;
Nagy 2005; Mai et al. 2008; Coram et al.
2008; Giri 2011). On the other hand, other
research does not support the claims that ten-
ure has negative influences on the quality of
the audit (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002;
Myers et al. 2003; Ghosh and Moon 2005).
Furthermore, whether or not auditor and part-
ner rotation is important is still debatable. The
studies on auditor rotation are related to the
audit’s fee, financial report’s quality, and
audit’s quality (Daugherty et al. 2013;
Johnson et al. 2002; Siregar et al. 2011) do
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not find that auditor rotation improves the
quality of  financial reports. Yet, Geiger and
Raghunandan (2002), Knechel et al. (2007)
show that auditor rotation has negative in-
fluences on financial reports and audits’ quali-
ties.
Artificial rotation is a condition in
which, conceptually, there has been a change
of auditor so that the relationship between
the audit firm and the client ends, but in fact
such a relationship is still ongoing (Junaidi et
al. 2012). Tenure is suspected of  breaking the
auditor’s independence, since over a long
time period there may be over-familiarity be-
tween the client and the auditor (Mautz and
Sharaf, 1961). Deis and Giroux (1992), Mansi,
et al. (2004), Nagy (2005), Mai, et al. (2008)
state that tenure has negative effects on au-
dits’ qualities. Coram et al. (2008) finds evi-
dence that, probably, to maintain their clients,
auditors tend to lower the standards expected
of a professional public accountant. In con-
trast, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), Myers
et al. (2003), Ghosh and Moon (2005) reject
the statement that tenure brings negative ef-
fects to an audit’s quality.
Conflict of interests is suspected to be
a factor in the audit quality’s degradation.
Carrera et al. (2007) shows that more than
half of all the auditor-client negotiations re-
ally influence the audit reports. Dharma-
saputra and Nafi (2007) state that Enron’s
financial reporting scandals in 2001 were
proven to encourage many countries to
strengthen their regulations on auditors and
their partners. However, whether or not man-
datory auditor rotation is important has since
been debatable. According to Dharmasaputra
and Nafi (2007), most of the other countries
consider that such a regulation is less impor-
tant, because there are only a few countries
adopting such regulations, including Indone-
sia.
Some research in America does not sup-
port the idea that the duration of the rela-
tionship between the auditor and client has a
negative influence on the audit’s quality
(Ghosh and Moon 2005, Myers et al. 2003,
Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). Geiger and
Raghunandan (2002) state that the errors in
audits’ reports are significantly more preva-
lent at the beginning of a relationship be-
tween the auditor and client. Ghosh and
Moon (2005) find that the perception of in-
vestors towards the quality of profits will in-
crease when the auditor’s tenure is longer.
Carcello and Nagy (2004) find the evidence
that cheating in financial reporting is more
likely to happen in the first three years of an
auditor’s tenure. Shafie et al. (2009), who did
their research in Malaysia, shows that audi-
tors’ tenure has significant positive effects on
the quality of  the auditors’ reports.
Meanwhile there is some research which
proves that auditors’ tenure brings negative
effects to the audit’s quality (Mai et al. 2008;
Nagy 2005; Mansi et al. 2004; Junaidi 2012).
Johnson et al. (2002) do not find evidence
that auditor rotation, when done to antici-
pate an auditor’s tenure, increases the qual-
ity of  the financial reports. Hartadi (2009)
finds that audit fees significantly influence the
audit’s quality, while auditor rotation and the
auditor’s reputation do not significantly in-
fluence the audit’s quality which is measured
by its total accrual. Giri (2011) finds that ten-
ure has negative effects on the audit’s qual-
ity, while the auditor’s reputation has no ef-
fect on it. However, Siregar (2011) finds that
there is no evidence that the duration of the
auditor’s tenure and auditor’s rotation in-
crease the audit’s quality.
Auditor independence will be tested
when the auditor’s firm is placed in a situa-
tion when they have to give their opinion
about their client’s financial reports. The In-
Junaidi et al.
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donesian Accountants’ Association (2001),
which has now become the Institute of In-
donesian Public Accountants, has adopted
auditing standards related to the assumption
of ‘going concerns’ that has been regulated
in the United States of America by the State-
ment on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 59:
The auditor’s considerations of  an entity’s
ability to continue as a ‘going concern’ SAS
No. 59 (AICPA, 1988) requires the auditor
to evaluate whether there is a substantial hesi-
tancy regarding the professionalism of the
client’s company to go on as a ‘going con-
cern.’
To give an audit opinion about compa-
nies where the professionalism of their
sustainability is questionable is not an easy
job. The decision about a ‘going concern’ is a
very difficult and ambiguous one (Chow et
al. 1987; Carmichael and Pany 1993; Carcello
and Neal 2000). When the auditor has de-
cided that there is a substantial hesitancy
about the client’s sustainability, the auditor
is allowed to give an unqualified modified
report, or even a disclaimer. Yet, almost no
authoritative guidance or research has been
published that an auditor can use to decide
which type of published ‘going concern’ re-
ports to issue (Lasllae and Anandarajan 1996).
Theory and Hypothesis
Development
Audit Quality
DeAngelo (1981a) states that an audit’s
quality contains 2 elements, the auditor’s
competency and independency. Competence
means that auditing must be done by those
who have the skills and have completed some
qualified technical training. Independence, in
terms of  an audit, means the auditor takes a
non-biased viewpoint when carrying out the
audit, evaluating the results, and making the
audit’s report. Coram et al. (2008) state that
the quality of an audit is shown by the prob-
ability of the auditor finding unintentional/
intentional errors in companies’ financial re-
ports, and the probability of the findings be-
ing reported in and attached to the audit’s
opinion. Furthermore, Peecher and Piercey
(2008) state that an audit’s quality is the prob-
ability of an auditor finding and reporting
violations found in the client’s accounting
system. The probability of the discovery of
a violation depends on the technical profes-
sionalism and independence of  the auditor.
The Concept of Independency
Independency is a mental attitude pos-
sessed by auditors to stop them from taking
sides when auditing (Mautz and Sharaf 1961).
Audit service users see that the auditor’s in-
dependence from the financial reports is
present when the reports from the compiler
and the users are being audited. Independence
is a component of professionalism which has
to be maintained by professional public ac-
countants. Independence, in this case, is that
public accountants prioritize the public’s
needs above the clients or auditors’ interests
when auditing the financial reports of the cli-
ents. Thus, in this case, the stance of  the au-
ditor is likely to be to prioritize the public’s
needs.
Audit Standards in Indonesia for
‘Going Concern’
PSA No. 30 and SA Section 341 (IPSA
30.01) provide guidance to auditors, regard-
ing the impact of the ability of the business
unit to continue to function in the auditor’s
opinion as follows:
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a. If the auditor believes that there are doubts
about the ability of the business unit to
survive for a reasonable period of  time, the
auditor should:
1. Obtain information about the manage-
ment’s plans to reduce the impact of
conditions and events.
2. Establish the possibility that such a plan
is effectively implemented.
b. If  the management does not have a plan to
reduce the impact of conditions and events
on the ability of the business unit to sur-
vive, the auditor should consider making a
statement of intent to not give any opin-
ion.
c. If the management has a plan, the next step
is for the auditor to consider the effective-
ness of the plan, as follows:
1. If the auditor finds no effective plan, the
auditor must express no opinion.
2. If the auditor finds the plan is effective
and the client expresses these circum-
stances in the notes of the financial
statements, the auditor expresses an un-
qualified opinion.
3. If the auditor finds the plan is effective
but the client does not disclose the cir-
cumstances in the notes of the financial
statements, the auditor expresses an un-
fair opinion.
Furthermore, the Institute of  Indone-
sian Public Accountants (2009) published the
Interpretation of the Statements for Standard
Auditing (IPSA 30.02) as a replacement for
PSA 30, which aims to provide interpreta-
tion, clarification, and further guidance to the
auditors when applying the PSA 30 regula-
tion on the auditor’s judgment about a
company’s ability to maintain its viability.
Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality
Auditor tenure shows the duration of
the relationship between an auditor and cli-
ent. Some research that has uncovered the
relationship between tenure and audit qual-
ity includes works by Geiger and
Raghunandan (2002), Johnson (2002), Myers
et al. (2003), Manry, et al. (2003), Carcello
and Nagy (2004), Ghosh and Moon (2005),
Carey and Simnett (2006), Knechel and
Vanstraelen (2007), Shafie et al. (2009), Al-
Thuneibat et al. (2010). Most of the research
in America rejects the statement that the du-
ration of the relationship between an auditor
and client brings negative effects to an audit’s
quality (for example like Geiger and
Raghunandan 2002; Myers et al. 2003;
Carcello and Nagy 2004; and Ghosh and
Moon 2005).
Carey and Simnett (2006) state that
there are two main arguments that support
the negative associations of  an auditor’s long
tenure and audit quality which are: (1) The
degradation of independence which may be
caused by the intensity of the personal rela-
tionship between the auditor and the client;
and (2) the deterioration in the audit partner’s
capacity to effect critical appraisal (described
in the IFAC Code of  Ethics as familiarity
threat. The development of a personal rela-
tionship between the management of the cli-
ent company and the auditor will threaten the
auditor’s independence. Davis et al. (2000)
explain that the supporters of auditor rota-
tion contend that such rotation will provide
‘a new appearance’ for the company’s finan-
cial information. They claim that the longer
an auditor tries to keep a client, the less the
auditor maintains their objectivity when as-
sessing the client’s statements, and the greater
is the possibility that there will be undetec-
ted errors in the financial reports.
Junaidi et al.
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Carey and Simnett (2006) show that
there is a negative significant relationship
between audit partners’ tenure and the audit’s
quality, and auditors will have a lesser ten-
dency to give a ‘going concern’ opinion in a
long tenure observation. Knechel and
Vanstraelen (2007) show that an auditor’s
decision about a ‘going concern’ opinion is
not influenced by tenure, in a sample of bank-
rupt companies, while in a sample of  ‘still in
business’ companies they find some evidence
of a negative relationship between an
auditor’s tenure and giving a ‘going concern’
opinion. Moreover they also state that the
evidence of whether the length of the tenure
increases or decreases the quality is weak.
Longer auditor tenures may be related
to the loss of awareness through over-famil-
iarity with the client (Mautz and Sharaf,
1961). Long auditor tenures can create eco-
nomic benefits for the auditor to become less
independent, in this case an auditor can bow
to the client’s pressure, in order to maintain
future audit fees (Hoyle, 1978). Davis et al.
(2002), Ghosh and Moon (2005), and Al-
Thuneibat et al. (2011) conclude that an
audit’s quality decreases as the duration of
the tenure grows. Based on the concept and
results of the research which are revealed, a
hypothesis can be postulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Auditor tenure has negative effects
on the auditor’s independence.
Auditor Rotation and Audit
Quality
The research by Geiger and
Raghunandan (2002), Myers et al. (2003),
Johnson et al. (2002) find that auditing and
financial reporting, and audit firms’ tenure
have a positive relationship, so that the re-
sults of the research do not support manda-
tory auditor rotations. Geiger and
Raghunandan (2002) find evidence that au-
ditors may be influenced by clients which they
had in previous years, and do not support the
arguments that propose mandatory auditor ro-
tation. Myers et al. (2003) say that they do
not find any evidence that supports the per-
ception that low quality audits are related to
long tenures by the auditor. Knechel and
Vantraelen (2007) find evidence that there is
no market reaction to auditors’ tenure and
switching, whereas the auditors’ indepen-
dence is not hampered by the duration of the
relationship between the auditor and their
client.
Lim and Tan (2010) show that the qual-
ity of the audits carried out for companies by
professional auditors are higher than those by
non-professional ones, when the auditor’s
tenure is longer. Furthermore, the increase in
the audit’s quality with a long tenure is higher,
if the auditor has a lower audit fee range than
the client. If a professional auditor for cer-
tain industries has to be rotated, there may
be no other choice for companies other than
to have to hire a non-professional auditor,
which potentially decreases the audit’s effi-
ciency and effectiveness (Knechel et al.
2007).
Chi et al. (2009) and Siregar (2011) do
not find that mandatory auditor rotations in-
crease an audit’s quality. They have studied
audit data from Taiwan, with a rotation pe-
riod of five years, which became mandatory
in 2004. It is not mentioned that they also
found no consistent evidence that supports
the conviction that mandatory audit firms’
rotation based on investor perceptions in-
creases the audit’s quality.
The supporters of rotation show that
an audit’s quality will increase as a result of
the decreasing familiarity with the client
(Nagy 2005). Furthermore, Jennings et al.
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(2006) using an experimental study approach
analyzing the opinions of 49 judges that at-
tended an advanced course at the National
College Yuditial, perceived that evidence re-
garding auditors’ independence can be in-
creased by strengthening the audited compa-
nies’ governance and auditor rotation. Fur-
thermore, Fargher and Liwei (2008) find evi-
dence that at the start of a period of tenure,
the quality of the accounting policy decreases,
but when there is a rotation, the quality of
the accounting policy increases. Mandatory
auditor rotations are based on 2 assumptions:
(1) Long relationships between the auditor
and client will interfere with the auditor’s in-
dependence, and influence his/her capabil-
ity for being neutral and objective, and (2)
mandatory auditor rotation will overcome
problems (if they exist) related to the long
relationship between the auditor and the cli-
ent (Jones, 2012).
Yurianto (2009) explains that generally,
in day-to-day practice, the Decree of the
Minister of  Finance No.17/PMK.01/2008
creates tricky situations for both audit firms
and their partners to exchange partners. For
this business, an auditor may change his name
to maintain and audit the same client. The
name change appears to show that the audi-
tor has been rotated, as per the regulation,
even though in reality, the switch of  auditors
is considered to be an artificial rotation, since
the client is still in the same relationship with
the auditor who has just changed his name.
This long period of association between the
auditor and client can destroy the auditor’s
independence. Long auditor tenures may
cause over-familiarity between the client and
auditor (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). Based on
the concept and the results of previous re-
searches, a second hypothesis can be formu-
lated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Auditor rotation has a positive in-
fluence on the auditor’s independence.
Methods
Population and Sample
The population used in this research are
auditors working in companies that are listed
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The
samples were chosen by using the purposive
sampling method. Further, the sample selec-
tion process based on the criteria above is
explained as shown in Table 1.
Research Model
The research model measures the ef-
fects of auditor tenure and auditor rotation
on the tendency of the auditor to give a ‘go-
ing concern’ opinion by considering some
control variables as Equation 1:
Notation:
IND: Independence as a dummy
variable, 1 shows indepen-
dent, 0 shows not indepen-
dent.
TENURE: The relationship periods
between auditor and client
which substantively hap-
pen, measured in years.
ROTATION: Dummy variable, 0 means
no rotation, and 1 means
auditor rotation.
REPUTATION: The size of the auditor,
which are differentiated
[    
1−   
]= Ln a + b
1
TENURE+
b
2
ROTATION+b
3
REPUTATION +
b
4
LSIZE+ b
5
AGE + e......................(1)
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into auditor with big 4 af-
filiated (given 1) and audi-
tor with non-big 4 affiliated
(given 0).
LSIZE: Logarithm of  total assets.
AGE: The ages of the companies,
which are measured in
years.
a: Constants
b1,b2,b3,b4,b5: Coefficients
e: Error
Definition of  Variable
Operational
This research tests the effects of the
auditor’s tenure and rotation on their inde-
pendence in cases where a ‘going concern’
opinion is given. The variables which are
measured consist of the dependent and in-
dependent variables. The definition of  the
operational and all the research variables’
measurements are explained below.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this research
model is independence. This variable is shown
by the matrix 2x3 as shown in Table 2.
The opinion, which is given by the au-
ditor, is divided into two, they are the ‘going
concern’ opinion and the ‘non-going concern’
opinion. The probability of a company fac-
ing financial problem(s) is measured by using
the revised Z-Score Altman model (2000),
in which Z= 6.56 WCTA + 3.26 RETA +
6.72 EBITTA + 1.05 BVETL + e. If the
value of the Z-Score is less than 1.1, it is
predicted that the company is likely to be
bankrupt (in a ‘distress’ area), which is then
Table 1. Sample Selection Process
Description Amount
Companies published financial reports in 2002-2010 2,809
Companies with incomplete data 962
Companies published successive financial reports in 2002-2010 with
complete data 1,847
Companies without auditor rotation 1,298
Companies with real auditor rotation (the auditor was changed/
switched with another new one and the affiliation was changed as well) 297
Companies with artificial auditor rotation (the auditor changed their name and
the affiliation kept going) 249*)
Companies audited by an auditor in a certain period of time, after a 1 year
break the companies were audited by the same auditor. 3*)
Total company samples 1,847
Note: *) artificial rotation
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given the value of 1. If the Z-Score is be-
tween 1.1 and 2.6, it is predicted that the
company did not have any guarantee of their
financial condition always being stable (in a
‘grey’ area), which is given the value of 2. If
the Z-Score is more than 2.6 it is predicted
that the company is not likely to go bankrupt
(in a ‘safe’ area), which is then given the value
of 3.
When the condition of a company is in
‘distress’, it supposes that their auditor gives
them a ‘Going Concern’ Opinion (GCO). If
the auditor does not give a GCO, it can be
concluded that the auditor is not independent.
Another scenario for the auditor to be judged
as not independent is that when the condi-
tion of a company is not in ‘distress’, the au-
ditor gives a GCO. On the other hand, if  a
company is in a ‘Distress’ (D) condition and
the auditor gives it a GCO, it can be con-
cluded that the auditor is independent. An-
other scenario for the auditor to be judged as
independent is that when a company is not
in a ‘distress’ condition, the auditor gives a
NGCO. The last but not least scenario is that
if a company is in a ‘Grey’ Area (GA) condi-
tion and the auditor gives either a GCO or
NGCO, it can be concluded that the auditor
is independent.
Independent Variable
Auditor Tenure
The variable of the auditors’ tenure
shows the duration of the relationship be-
tween an auditor and client, which is mea-
sured in years. Although an auditor’s tenure
is measured by the number of years, as per
the research by Myers et al. (2003) and Ghosh
Table 2. Matrix of  the Relation between Financial Condition and Auditor Opinion
Financial Condition Auditor Opinion
GCO (‘Going Concern’ NGCO (‘Non-Going Concern’
Opinion) Opinion)
Distress I (Independent) NI (Not Independent)
Grey Area I I
Non Distress NI (Not Independent) I
Notation:
Distress: Companies which faced financial problems
Grey Area: Cannot determine whether companies are run well or face financial problems
Non Distress: Companies which did not face any financial problems based on the Altman method
(2000).
GCO: ‘Going concern’ opinion given by the auditor
NGCO: ‘Non-going concern’ opinion given by the auditor
NI: Not an independent auditor
I: Independent auditor
Junaidi et al.
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and Moon (2005), there is a difference with
this research and the previous studies. Myers
et al. (2003) and Ghosh and Moon (2005)
measured the tenure by the number of years
the relationship between the auditor and cli-
ent existed in formal terms, whereas, in this
research, the auditors’ tenure is measured
based on the duration of the relationship be-
tween the auditor and client in substantive
terms, by considering the existence of  any
artificial auditor rotations.
Auditor Rotation
The second independent variable is au-
ditor rotation which shows that there has
been a change/switch of auditor done by the
client, either voluntarily or mandated by regu-
lations/law. The rotation variable is a dummy
variable, where q shows that there has been
an auditor rotation, and 0 shows that there is
no rotation.
Furthermore, it can be seen that there
exist artificial auditor rotations. Artificial ro-
tations show that it seems there has been
some sort of auditor rotation but in fact the
relationship between the auditor and the cli-
ent is still ongoing. Artificial rotation is done
using the following methods:
a. The audit firm changes its name (the name
of a partner is changed in some way), and
the firm’s affiliations are kept going.
b. The audit firm changes its name (all the
partners’ names are changed) and the firm’s
affiliations are kept going.
c. The auditor who audits a client is changed/
switched for another auditor, but after one
year goes by, the first auditor resumes au-
diting the original client.
Control Variable
This research uses some control vari-
ables to control the factors which may influ-
ence an auditor’s independence as per the
research by Carey and Simnett (2006) and
Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007). Those are
the auditor’s reputation, the company’s size,
and the company’s age.
Analysis of the Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for each variable
can be explained by the Table 3. Table 3 ex-
plains that the total number of company
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of  Company Samples
Variable N Minimum Maximum Average Standard
Deviation
Rotation 1,847 0 1 0.30 0.457
Tenure 1,847 1 13 3.75 2.607
Age 1,847 2 95 28.90 14.658
Reputation 1,847 0 1 0.54 0.498
Logarithm of total assets 1,847 5 16 100.54 1.899
Independence 1,847 0 1 0.70 0.458
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samples in this research is 1,847. The vari-
ables consist of five independent variables:
Rotation, tenure, age, reputation, and the
logarithm of total assets, and one dependent
variable, independence. The rotation variable
is a categorical variable with a minimum vari-
able value of 0, and a maximum of 1, with a
standard deviation of 0.457. The tenure vari-
able shows the duration of the unification
between the auditor and client, which has a
minimum value of 1 year and a maximum
value of 13 years, with an average value of
3.75 years and a standard deviation of 2.607.
The variable of the companies’ ages shows a
minimum value of 2 years and a maximum
value of 95 years with an average value of
28.90 years and a standard deviation of
14.658. The reputation variable is a dummy
variable which has a minimum value of 0, a
maximum value of 1, and a standard devia-
tion of 0.498. The variable of the logarithm
of total assets shows a minimum value of 5,
a maximum value of 16, an average value of
10.54 and a standard deviation of 1.899.
Furthermore, the independence variable is a
categorical variable with a minimum value of
0, a maximum value of 1, and a standard de-
viation of 0.458.
Table 4 shows that from all the samples,
as many as 23.3 percent have more than 5
years of tenure, and the remaining 76.7 per-
cent have less than 5 years of tenure. It means
that although there has been a rotation, ten-
ure is substantively still ongoing. From Table
4, it appears that the shortest tenure is 1 year
and the longest is 13 years.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Auditor
Tenure
Rotation Frequency Percentage
No auditor rotation 1,298 70.3
Auditor rotation 549 29.7
Total 1,847 100.0
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Indepen-
dence
Independence Frequency Percentage
Not independent 551 29.8
Independent 1,296 70.2
Total 1,847 100.0
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Com-
pany Samples’ Tenure
Tenure Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Percentage
1 412 22.3 22.3
2 350 18.9 41.3
3 280 15.2 56.4
4 209 11.3 67.7
5 167 9.0 76.8
6 134 7.3 84.0
7 95 5.1 89.2
8 77 4.2 93.3
9 62 3.4 96.7
10 25 1.4 98.1
11 19 1.0 99.1
12 16 0.9 99.9
13 1 0.1 100.0
Total 1,847 100.0
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The rotation variable can be seen in
Table 5, during the period from 2002-2010
there had been 549 auditor rotations. The de-
scription of the independence variable can
be seen in Table 6, from 2002-2010 there
were 551 audits of  firms which were indi-
cated as not being independent, and 1,296
audits which were considered independent.
Multicolinearity Testing
Based on the test results shown in Table
7, it is seen that the VIF values < 10.Thus, it
can be concluded that there is no
multicolinearity problem with the research
models.
Capacity of Model Classification
Table 8 shows the capacity of  the mod-
els to classify the auditors’ independence. In
total, 72.1 percent of the models are able to
correctly estimate the auditors’ independence.
Appropriateness of Logistic Regression
Model
The next step is assessing the appropri-
ateness of the logistic regression model by
using Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness of
fit testing. The results of  the appropriateness
testing show that the value of Hosmer and
Lemeshow’s goodness of  fit is 0.397. Because
the value of  significance is bigger than 0.05,
Table 7. Multicolinearity Testing
Colinearity Statistic
Variable Tolerance VIF
Tenure 0.963 1.038
Rotation 0.905 1.105
Age 0.951 1.051
Reputation 0.895 1.117
Logarithm of
total assets 0.931 1.074
Table 8.Capability of the Models to Clas-
sify Independence
Independence Percentage
Observation Not Inde- Inde-
pendent pendent
Not Independent 59 492 10.7
Independent 24 1,272 98.1
Total percentage 72.1
Table 9. Results of  Logistic Regression Testing
Variable B S.E. df p-value
Rotation *) 1.001 0.112 1 0.000
Tenure **) -0.101 0.021 1 0.000
Age -0.001 0.004 1 0.748
Reputation -0.143 0.112 1 0.200
Logarithm of total assets -0.008 0.029 1 0.771
Constant 0.763 0.356 1 0.032
Nagelkerke R Square is 0.07
Notes: *) Tenure shows the duration of  the relationship of  the auditor in auditing the client, which is measured in
years.
**) Rotation is a dichotomy variable that shows the existence of rotation which is described by the value of 0
for no auditor rotation, and the value of 1 for auditor rotation.
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the logistic regression model is appropriate
to be used for explaining the independence.
Hypothesis Testing
The testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2 sup-
ported the results of the logistic regression
testing, as shown in Table 9.
Based on the summary, model testing
shows the Nagelkerke R Square value is 0.07.
This indicates that the independent variable
in the model can explain the dependent vari-
ables 7 percent of the time, and the rest is
explained by other variables.
Hypothesis 1’s testing was for the ef-
fects of tenure (the duration of the relation-
ship between auditor and client) on their in-
dependence. The testing shows a significance
value of 0.000, with a coefficient of -0.101.
Thus, Hypothesis 1, which is explained sta-
tistically, is supported. This shows that the
duration of the relationship between the au-
ditor and client has negative effects on the
auditor’s independence. The results of  the
analysis show that the relationship between
auditor and client over a long time period
make the auditor tend to be less or not inde-
pendent. There have been regulations on the
limits of  a relationship’s duration between
auditor and client, which is a maximum of 5
years. However, the descriptive statistic
shows that 23.5 percent of tenures last more
than 5 years. This shows that although there
have been clear regulations on the period of
the relationship between auditor and client,
the auditors still look for chances to keep their
relationships with their clients going, so this
influences the auditors’ independence.
This finding supports Knechel and
Vanstraelen (2007), Carey and Simnett
(2006), Giri (2011) and Junaidi et al. (2012)
who show that there is a negative relation-
ship between auditors’ tenure and the ten-
dency of the auditors to give ‘going concern’
opinions on the back of  long tenures. As a
result, the limitation of  the relationship’s
duration between auditor and client is impor-
tant since, over a long time period, the rela-
tionship can reduce the auditor’s indepen-
dence. Opinion giving is an important part
of  an auditor’s job. Thus, as professionals,
auditors must be able to show their commit-
ment to maintaining their independence. The
existence of limitations to the length of the
relationship’s duration between auditor and
client is seen as an effort to maintain and
improve the auditors’ independence.
The regulations on auditors’ rotation are
expected to be applied effectively, to main-
tain the auditors’ independence. Further, the
second hypothesis’ testing analyzes the effects
of auditors’ rotation on auditors’ indepen-
dence. The analysis shows the significance
value is 0.000 with a positive direction (a
coefficient of 1.001). This indicates that the
hypothesis which states that auditor rotations
positively influence auditors’ independence
is statistically supported.This study’s findings
differ from Siregar et al. (2011) who found
no evidence that longer auditors’ tenures and
auditors’ rotations increased the quality of
audits.
This is in line with the first hypothesis,
that the lengthy duration of the relationship
between an auditor and his/her client can
reduce the auditor’s independence. Therefore,
rotation can increase the audit’s quality since
a long relationship can reduce the auditor’s
independence, considering the familiarity
between the auditor and client. Even though
there are debates on whether or not the regu-
lation about rotation is important, this writer
thinks that such a regulation is still needed,
considering that, as professionals, accoun-
tants surely have to maintain their quality and
independence.
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Sensitivity Analysis
This research also includes some sensi-
tivity testing to check for the robustness of
the main model’s testing.
Sensitivity Test on the Effect of  the Types
of Auditor Rotations on Auditors’
Independence.
This test is done to see the effect of
auditor rotations on auditors’ independence.
The types of rotations are divided into two:
An artificial auditor rotation and a non-arti-
ficial auditor rotation. The analysis shows a
p-value of 0.000 and a coefficient value of -
1.796. This indicates that artificial rotation
has significant negative effects on the audi-
tors’ independence. This finding supports the
first hypothesis which states that auditors’
tenure has negative effects on auditors’ inde-
pendence. It means, even though there is a
rotation, the relationship between the audi-
tor and the client does not end, so that this
ongoing relationship can interfere with the
auditor’s independence.
The Effects of  Auditor Tenure on Auditors’
Independence in Each Industry
The effects of auditors’ tenure on audi-
tors’ independence in each industry can be
seen in Table 10.
The tenure is divided into short tenure
and long tenure. Short tenure means the maxi-
mum period of the relationship between au-
ditor and client is 5 years, and long tenure
means the relationship lasted more than 5
years. Table 10 shows that the types of  com-
panies which are most likely to have long ten-
ure and whose auditors are not independent
are manufacture companies, numbering 67,
whereas companies with long tenure but have
independent auditors is also manufacture
companies, which number 174.
Table 10. The Effects of  Auditor Tenure on Auditors’ Independence in Each Industry
Not independent Independent
Industry Long Tenure Short Tenure Long Tenure Short Tenure
Amount Amount Amount Amount
Agriculture 2 5 4 25
Animal feed 3 2 3 10
Mining 0 2 4 30
Construction 0 0 3 6
Manufacturing 67 134 174 535
Transportation 7 16 20 20
Communication 2 4 2 10
Wholesale & retail 6 7 19 49
Banks, Credit agency, Securities,
Insurance, Real estate 54 197 29 245
Hotels & travel services 3 5 7 18
Others 8 27 11 72
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The Effects of Auditor Rotation on
Auditors’ Independence in Each Industry
This test is carried out to see the effects
of auditor rotations on auditors’ indepen-
dence, in this case it is tested on companies
with rotations and companies without rota-
tions.
Table 11 shows that the greatest num-
ber of companies that have rotation and
whose auditors are independent is again the
manufacture companies, numbering 148.
The next test is done to see the effects
of the type of rotation on the auditors’ inde-
pendence in each industry. There were 549
rotations during our observation period. Table
11 describes that artificial rotations without
independent conditions occurred in the bank-
ing, credit agency, securities, insurance, and
real estate industries, amounting to 26 in-
stances, whereas artificial rotations with in-
dependent conditions occurred in manufac-
ture industries as 116.
Table 13 shows that artificial rotations
occurring after more than 5 years tenure
amounted to 89 rotations, and in less than 5
years tenure they numbered 163 rotations.
Table 14 explains the relationship be-
tween the type of rotation and the auditors’
reputation. Based on Table 14, it can be seen
that auditors who have affiliations with big 4
and have done an artificial rotation amount
to 155, whereas auditors who have affiliations
with non-big 4 auditors and have done an
artificial rotation number 97.
Table 11. The Effect of  Auditor Rotation on Auditors’ Independence in Each Industry
Not independent Independent
No rotation Rotation No rotation Rotation
Industry Amount Amount Amount Amount
Agriculture 2 5 23 6
Animal feed 2 3 12 1
Mining 0 2 22 12
Construction 0 0 6 3
Manufacture 94 107 561 148
Transportation 12 11 35 5
Telecommunication 3 3 10 2
Wholesale & retail 4 9 55 13
Banks, Credit agency, Securities,
Insurance, Real estate 171 80 181 93
Hotels & travel services 6 2 18 7
Others 17 18 64 19
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Table 12. The Effects of  Rotation Type on Auditors’ Independence in Each Industry
Not independent Independent
Artificial Non-Artificial Artificial Non-artificial
Rotation Rotation Rotation Rotation
Industry Amount Amount Amount Amount
Agriculture 0 0 5 6
Animal feed 2 0 1 1
Mining 0 0 3 11
Construction 0 0 0 3
Manufacture 14 23 116 102
Transportation 6 1 7 2
Telecommunication 2 0 1 2
Wholesale & retail 3 2 7 10
Banks, Credit agency, Securities,
Insurance, Real estate 26 37 38 71
Hotels & travel services 2 0 3 4
Others 6 4 10 17
Table13. Relation between Rotation and
Tenure
Tenure
>5 years  5 years
Rotation type Amount Amount
Artificial 89 163
Real 18 279
Table 14.The Relation between Rotation
Type and Auditors’ Reputation
Type of Rotation
Artificial Real
Auditor’s Reputation Amount Amount
Non big 4 97 201
Big 4 155 95
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Control Variable Testing
The control variable is a variable which
is controlled or made constant so that the
relationship of the independent variable to-
wards the dependent variable is not influ-
enced by external factors which have not been
studied. There are three variables which are
put into the companies in our study: The
company’s size, their auditor’s reputation, and
the company’s age. The company’s size shows
a significance level of 0.866 which means this
variable does not influence auditors’ indepen-
dence, measured by them giving a ‘going con-
cern’ opinion. This case is different from the
research of Mutchler et al. (1997), and
Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007), which
stated that an auditor who gives a ‘going con-
cern’ opinion is inversely proportional to the
size of  their client’s company.
The age variable shows a significance
level of 0.694. Thus, the age variable statis-
tically does not influence the independence.
This finding supports the results of research
done by Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) and
contradicts the research of Carey and Simnett
(2006) which stated that the age variable is
inversely proportional to the tendency of get-
ting a ‘going concern’ opinion. Older compa-
nies tend to be able to adapt better to the
conditions of their business’ environment.
Experienced managers of these companies
will be able to anticipate any financial prob-
lems that may influence the audit’s quality.
The auditors’ reputation variable shows
a significance value of 0.219. This means
that, statistically, the reputation variable does
not significantly influence an auditor’s inde-
pendence. This is related to the quality of
the auditing carried out, and the audit firm,
whether it is big or small, which does not have
any difference on the quality of the audits it
conducts. Big and small auditor firms will
maintain their quality, based on the Profes-
sional Public Accountants’ Standards. This
is different to the research done by Mutchler,
et al. (1997), Francis and Yu (2009) and
DeFond et al. (2002) which found that the
larger firms of  auditors were more likely to
give ‘going concern’ opinions.
Result and Policy Implication
Based on the analysis, the logistic re-
gression shows that tenure has a negative ef-
fect on an auditor’s independence. There are
some significant differences between the ef-
fects of a short tenure and the effects of a
longer tenure on the auditor’s independence.
Those results are supported by a sensitivity
test which shows that tenures of up to 6 years
have negative effects on auditors’ indepen-
dence. This gives the implication that over a
long period, an auditor-client relationship can
reduce the auditor’s independence. For that,
regulation on the duration of the relationship
between auditor and client must effectively
enforce the limitations of auditors’ tenure.
The government has published the De-
cree of  the Minister of  Finance No.423/
KMK.06/2002, which was superseded by the
Decree of  the Minister of  Finance No.359/
KMK.06/2003, which obliged companies to
limit an auditor’s assignment period to 5 years
and a public accountant’s to 3 years. That
decree then was revised by the Decree of the
Minister of  Finance No.17/PMK.01/2008
about public accountants’ service which set
the limit of the auditors’ assignment period
at 6 years and public accountants’ at 3 years.
Based on the results of this research, the ef-
fectiveness of the auditors’ tenure regulation
of 6 years needs to be reconsidered, since
auditor tenures of up to 6 years have nega-
tive effects on auditors’ independence. In
other words, since long tenures can decrease
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auditors’ independence, the regulation on
auditors’ tenure should be for a maximum of
5 years, or less. This limitation to 5 years is in
line with Law No.5 of  2011 about public ac-
countants. In relation to the regulation on
public accountants’ service rotation, it is writ-
ten in Article 11 PP 20/2015 in which Ar-
ticle 11 Verse (1) explained that: The service
of  auditing historical financial information as
per what is meant in Article 10 Verse (1) let-
ter “a,” to a certain entity by a public accoun-
tant is limited to be at most only 5 (five) years
financial records in succession.
Until today, the regulation on auditors’
rotation is only effective for local auditors,
whereas there is no regulation about foreign
auditors’ rotations. Practically, this regulation
can be bypassed by employing an artificial ro-
tation of auditors, in which the auditors only
change their names. Thus deeper consider-
ation about regulating the rotations is really
needed. If the assumptions given in this re-
search are right, that basically auditors do not
want to lose their clients, and auditors’ ten-
ures are reduced (a maximum of 5 years),
there will be an equalization of income for
the audit firms, without neglecting their qual-
ity. It can be concluded that instead of  the
regulation on auditors’ rotation being bypassed
so easily, it would be better if  the govern-
ment regulates the partners in audit firms’ ro-
tations. This is in line with the newest regu-
lation on the rotation of public accountants
as presented in Article 11 of Government
Regulation 20/2015.
Research Findings
Auditor’s independence is still an inter-
esting topic to be studied by empirical re-
search. If the assumptions used in this re-
search are right, that basically auditor firms
do not want to lose their clients and their
potential fees, it means that independence
becomes a very crucial thing, even though
the effects of audit fees on the quality of
audits have not been conclusive. In other
words, the effects of  tenure on an audit’s
quality can be biased towards the company’s
size, since big companies are assumed to be
more complex, so that the potential fees will
be higher. Another finding is that artificial ro-
tations substantially cause auditors’ relation-
ships with their clients to be maintained. As
a result, it can be concluded that the regula-
tion for mandatory auditors’ (client) rotation
are needed.
Conclusions, Limitations, and
Suggestions
Nowadays, it is considered that the
quality of the audits being carried out has
dropped, since there are many suspected fac-
tors that influence the quality. Auditor ten-
ure is a factor that may interfere with an
auditor’s independence, considering that over
a long time period there can be over-famil-
iarity between the client and auditor. The
phenomenon of the artificial rotations occur-
ring in Indonesia is interesting and worthy of
deeper study considering the regulation for
mandatory auditors’ rotation that has been
published by the government. Artificial rota-
tion shows a condition in which, theoretically,
there has been a change of auditor, so that
the relationship between the audit firm and
the client ends, but in fact the relationship is
still ongoing. The relationship between audi-
tor and client over a long period of time can
interfere with the auditor’s independence.
Artificial auditor rotation is also worth
further study since the relationship between
auditor and client over a long period of time
is also suspected to interfere with the
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auditor’s independence. The results of  this
study show that the duration of the relation-
ship between the auditor and client has nega-
tive effects on the auditor’s independence.
That kind of  long term relationship can make
the auditor less independent. The results of
the sensitivity analysis show that there are
significant differences between the effects of
a short tenure and long tenure on auditors’
independence.
Auditor rotation significantly influences
auditors’ independence. The positive direc-
tion of this result shows that auditor rota-
tion can maintain an auditor’s independence.
This result implies that auditor rotation is
important since a long relationship between
the auditor and their client can influence the
auditor’s independence. Furthermore, sensi-
tivity analysis shows that artificial auditor ro-
tation has negative effects on the auditors’
independence. This indicates that the think-
ing behind artificial rotation needs to be given
further attention, especially by the auditors’
regulatory body. The regulation of  auditors’
rotations is important and must be able to be
enforced effectively in practice. What needs
to be avoided are auditor rotations which are
done for the sake of fulfilling the regulation,
but which neglect the fact that there is a big-
ger need to be maintained, which is the audi-
tors’ independence, to boost the quality of
the audits they carry out. This finding con-
firms the concept of  independence, in that
an auditor has to possess a strong mental at-
titude to not take any side when auditing.
Limitations
The research into the effects of audi-
tors’ tenure on auditors’ independence, which
is measured by their giving ‘going concern’
opinions does not include data from compa-
nies which faced financial problems, or were
declared bankrupt. Furthermore, the period
of  observation is also limited, starting from
2002 up to 2010, because after the year 2008,
the regulation for the relationship period be-
tween auditor and client was changed. This
research focuses only on companies which
were listed on the Indonesian Stock Ex-
change, whereas there many other medium-
and small-scale companies that could be in-
cluded in the research.
One of the artificial auditor rotation
measurements uses the assumption that, af-
ter a grace period of 1 year from the end of
the first relationship period, the client will be
audited by the same audit firm, but in fact
the firm that actually does the audit is the
previous audit firm. The researcher faced
some difficulties in collecting evidence about
the auditors who carried out the audits in that
1 year grace period.
Independence is measured by seeing the
relationship between the results of the audi-
tors’ stated opinions and the financial condi-
tion of  the audited companies. This research
does not include companies which were con-
sidered to be doubtful of remaining as a ‘go-
ing concern’ and which were then made
bankrupt. Although statistically, an auditor’s
tenure has significant negative effects on the
auditor’s independence, theoretically it has
not been proven, as the results of research
which tested those issues have not been con-
clusive.
Suggestions
Future research could be done into the
same topic, but with different measurements
of  the audits’ quality, such as fraud and the
financial reports’ quality. Besides, future re-
search can include the fee variable as one of
the indicators that may influence an audit’s
quality. Future researches can also be done
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using the same approach, by extending the
duration of  the observation period and wid-
ening the sample to include not only compa-
nies that are listed on the Indonesian Stock
Exchange, but also those which are not listed.
Besides this, the study into tenure can be
broadened by testing the duration of the re-
lationship of  the audit firms’ partners and
clients.
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